3 policies were in line with containment, for example in criticizing communist regimes, or when they could be pushed in less strategically important areas, they were pursued. On the other hand, when anticommunist credentials and political stability were deemed necessary, the United States was willing to mute criticism of pro-Western dictators.
Finally, full implementation of a human rights policy was constrained by the limited institutional power of governmental human rights advocates and by minimal domestic political support for a human rights focus. In the U.S. foreign policy-making process, an idea, no matter how worthy, will not be implemented unless it has strong and savvy supporters who are able to push it through the various bureaucratic or congressional debates. Weakness of human rights advocates was partially ameliorated by the creation of the State Department's Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Bureau in 1977 and the rise of non-governmental human rights organizations in the 1970s. In its early years, though, the Bureau was given little respect or cooperation by other bureaucratic players. 8 The NGOs had limited funding and policy expertise and often were excluded from the relatively closed foreign policy-making system of the era.
Thus, although there is a long-standing American tradition of rhetorical support for human rights and several historical and institutional changes led to development of a human rights policy, translating ideals into practical application was difficult. Analysts looking at any given period through the 1980s could point to new ways human rights were shaping policies, but
were also left acknowledging, and often lamenting, the particular era's constraints on full implementation. 9 
NEW FOCUS IN A NEW PERIOD
The end of the Cold War and other contemporaneous shifts appeared to finally remove all the long-standing limitations on U.S. human rights policy. Many felt that the United States now stood alone as a hegemon and had the power to influence decisions in countries around the globe. The collapse of communism also led many to agree with Francis Fukuyama's idea that history had reached its end and liberal democracy had emerged triumphant. 10 Therefore, the 4 United States, as the leading democracy, would just have to nudge a few recalcitrant states into line with the inevitable. Global trends also appeared favorable. Increased economic globalization seemed to enable the United States and other leading powers to use trade and other economic policies as carrots and sticks to enforce human rights. 11 Also, state sovereignty appeared to be weakening. The international community increasingly accepted the idea that powerful countries, like the United States, would lead international efforts to bring recalcitrant states' policies in line with international norms.
The United States still retained some wariness of multilateralism and was unwilling to accept the levels of internal monitoring and joint action seen in the polices of other global human rights leaders, 12 but there were important shifts in U.S. attitudes beginning in the late-1980s.
During the Cold War, U.S. officials were often hesitant to establish powerful U.N. agencies.
They feared that the Soviet Union and its communist allies, perhaps in conjunction with newly independent states that might see some Western actions as reminders of colonial imposition, would skew U.N. debates and definitions of which rights should be protected. Moves toward democracy in Russia, Eastern Europe, and the developing world reduced those worries. The end of the Soviet veto in the Security Council also increased the chance of U.S.-controlled multilateral action. Finally, after the long Cold War, the United States was looking to shift some of the burden of world responsibility to its allies and multilateral institutions.
The Cold War's end also took away major competing policy priorities. With the Soviet threat gone, the United States appeared to have new flexibility in bilateral relationships and overall strategic planning. Human rights goals could rise and security considerations decline.
Particular country-specific interests such as counternarcotics goals in Colombia, military cooperation in Turkey, or regional cooperation in Egypt remained to complicate policy priorities, but there appeared to be no global doctrine that would conflict with the pursuit of human rights.
By the late-1980s, the policy-making position of human rights advocates had been strengthened by institutional growth of both governmental and non-governmental agencies.
Also, the foreign policymaking system opened somewhat after Vietnam to allow more independent activity by Congress, the press, interest groups, and the general public. Support from non-governmental actors became increasingly crucial and their access to decision-makers increased.
Taken together, the various changes of the late-1980s appeared to have removed the old limitations. The United States was powerful, more willing to act multilaterally, free of major competing priorities, and had stronger human rights advocates. Therefore, within many government, NGO, and academic circles, there was great optimism that a new policy era had emerged and human rights considerations could move forward unencumbered. 13 Before examining the extent to which human rights policies in this new era have or have not matched that optimism, it is important to note a couple methodological ideas. For the purpose of this argument, the post-Cold War era will be defined as beginning in 1991. The major policy event of that year, the Persian Gulf War, was a harbinger of policies to come, not a throwback to the Cold War era policies. Therefore, the period includes the end of George H.W.
Bush's presidency and the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. There are differences among the viewpoints and rhetoric of these three presidents. For example, the elder Bush pursued more ad hoc policies, while Clinton laid out a grander vision and had more commitment to international organizations. 14 Clinton and the younger Bush have important differences on how to define rights and how to pursue objectives. For definitions, Clinton usually drew off existing international treaties and common law, while Bush has put more focus on the less legally binding idea of God-given human "dignity." On tactics, Clinton often acted multilaterally, while Bush is more willing to act unilaterally. 15 These differences are real, and reflect both ideological disputes and the very different world conditions faced by each president.
However, if one examines the specific country policies followed by the three presidents, there is significant and important continuity. Also, differences in presidential tactics are very often differences of degree, not kind. The human rights literature commonly analyzes policy development by administration, but this paper will focus on substantive policy trends across the three administrations.
THE STEPS FORWARD
Since the end of the Cold War, increased focus on human rights in policy-making has continued.
The steps forward are diverse, but can be organized around four main themes: rhetorical support for human rights, proactive measures to spread democracy and rights, new targeted legislation, and new acceptance of international human rights treaties and legal authority.
Rhetorical Support
All three post-Cold War presidents have laid out an overall vision guiding policy. All three visions have incorporated and strengthened the idea of pursuing human rights and democracy. In justifying the Persian Gulf War, George Bush spoke of an emerging "New World Order" based on international norms and rights. 16 Clinton, and his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, looked for a vision to replace containment and spoke of "democratic enlargement" that would "foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies where possible." 17 For George W. Bush, the guiding vision has been defeating terrorism. As will be discussed later, this vision has complicated the pursuit of a human rights agenda, but Bush has also reinforced the idea that, in order to defeat terrorism and assure security, America must lead the fight for individual rights.
In his 2002 State of the Union address Bush explained, "America will lead by defending liberty and justice… [and] will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, private property, free speech, equal justice, and religious tolerance." 18 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America issued in September 2000 pledged to "press governments that deny human rights."
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Beyond these sweeping visions, the promotion of human rights has become a regular part of arguments used to justify many policies. Crucially, it is now often argued that the United
States need not choose between human rights and other interests, because defense of human rights aids other interests. This view stems partly from acceptance of the academic conventional wisdom that no two democracies have ever fought each other. Furthermore, many government officials believe that countries with good human rights records are more likely to work with the United States on transnational issues like drugs and proliferation, to engage in more trade, and, in the words of one State Department official, to be "the best partners and only true allies for our nation." 20 These statements show that human rights promotion is fully entrenched as a U.S.
policy goal.
Proactive Policies
Traditionally, human rights policies have focused on criticizing violators and punishing them through a variety of symbolic, economic, and legal means. In the post-Cold War period, the United States has continued to implement such polices. For example, the State Department's Annual Report on Human Rights, whose influence is illustrated each year by the strenuous denials and counter-attacks advanced by countries singled out for criticism, has been strengthened. Also, the United States has leading diplomatic efforts to punish violators in places such as Serbia, Haiti, Iraq, Zimbabwe, and Burma. Importantly, though, the United States has increasingly adopted more proactive policies that attempt to stop abuses before they occur and
give greater reward for human rights progress.
One sign of this shift has been the rise of humanitarian interventions. There are always multiple interests driving major military interventions, but U.S. actions in Somalia, Haiti, and
Kosovo were driven to a large degree by human rights and humanitarian priorities. Operation
Restore Hope in Somalia was prompted by humanitarian desires to stop the civil war and establish order so that food relief could reach the starving population. 21 In Haiti's case, the refugee issue played a major role in policy calculations, but even once much of that flow had been reduced, Clinton tried a number of pressures and appeared ready to fight for democracy in Latin America. 22 Ultimately, a major invasion was headed off only by last minute negotiations that restored to power the democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In Kosovo, the United States led NATO efforts aimed at stopping Serbian abuses. 23 Importantly, this intervention occurred against an existing government acting in its sovereign territory. None of these interventions proved entirely successful, but it is striking is that they were made at all. The program has been slow to become fully operational. Implementation questions also remain, such as whether the program is so targeted that it will exclude many of the world's poorest, or conversely whether it will become so broad that it risks becoming politicized in ways that have hurt past programs. Many development and human rights groups have welcomed MCA as a new tool to induce change. The embrace of aid and human rights criteria by a conservative Republican president has been described as having a "Nixon-goes-to-China flavor" 26 and is another indication of how human rights goals have become important components of U.S. policy.
New Targeted Legislation
A third development of this new era has been a shift to targeted legislation. During the Carter period, the focus was on broad legislative restrictions on U.S. foreign aid. Often referred to as 502B restrictions, the law states that no security assistance may be provided to any country that engages in a "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." 27 In practice, however, aid only rarely has been restricted. 28 Neither the executive branch nor
Congress has wanted to antagonize U.S. allies by labeling them as abusers, and even nongovernmental human rights leaders like Aryeh Neier note that 502B is "like an atom bomb; it may have more benefit before you actually use it." 29 In response to the step back of non- 105-261). These terms are often referred to as the "Leahy Law;" however, because they are actually appropriations riders, they must be renewed each year as part of the appropriations cycle. The Leahy language brought three significant changes. First, the law theoretically keeps U.S. aid out of the hands of actors that are among the worst violators because it targets military units who often lead state abuse. Second, the law promotes prosecution of violators because aid can be continued if the recipient country is taking action to bring the offenders to justice. Third, and most crucially, it gives the United States a targeted human rights tool to supplement the blunt weapon of 502B. In 1998, the law stopped the Turkish Anti-Terror Police from purchasing armored vehicles. Subsequently, it has affected discussions with Indonesia, Mexico and others.
In late-2002, the Bush administration announced that, for the first time, it was suspending aid to a Colombian Air Force unit accused of using helicopter-launched rockets against civilians.
New targeted legislation has also been put in place to punish countries that violate religious freedom. The International Religious Freedom Act (P.L. 105-292) was signed into law on October 27, 1998 after several years of work by faith-based organizations and religious conservatives in Congress. 30 The law establishes an Office on International Religious Freedom within the State Department led by an Ambassador at Large. The office monitors religious persecution, recommends policies to promote freedom, and compiles its own report in conjunction with the annual human rights reports. The law also provides a long list of actions the president can take to punish violators. More of the sanctions were mandated in original drafts of the legislation, but the Clinton administration pressed for flexibility in determining which countries should be targeted, what actions should be taken, and when the sanctions could be waived. Some observers have complained that this flexibility allows the administration too great an ability to avoid criticizing allies. 31 At a minimum, though, the law adds another layer of review and potential condemnation and punishment, so that violators may be induced to change their policies.
International Treaties and Legal Authority
A fourth post-Cold War development was increased United States participation in international agreements and multilateral institutions. Since 1988, the United States has ratified four international human rights treaties that it had ignored for decades. Conventions on Genocide,
11
Torture, and Racial Discrimination, along with the fundamental International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, were all ratified by 1994. As will be discussed in more detail later, the ratifications came with some "reservations" and "understandings." Also, in 1998, Clinton signed an executive order stating that it is the policy and practice of the U.S. government "fully to respect and implement its obligation under international human rights treaties to which it is a party." 32 These ratifications and commitments simply brought the United States in line with much of the rest of the international community that had already ratified the agreements, but they
were an important symbol of a new U.S. attitude as the Cold War ended. Europeans also have argued that the United States has followed a unilateralist foreign policy with little consultation. Without allied support, the United States may be powerful by some measures, but it lacks both the moral authority and resources to challenge every violator.
The combination of the global economy giving countries multiple sources for trade and the lack of allied cooperation has led many observers to conclude that a third limit on U.S. power is that sanctions rarely achieve their intended purpose. Sanctions often appeal to those who are by international bodies. 42 In 2002, the United States was able to regain its seat, but the commission had been much less active in the intervening year. For example, the United States could not find any country willing to sponsor a tough resolution against China. A former public member of the U.S. delegation attributed the reluctance to Chinese threats to economically punish countries that acted against China in international forums. 43 These various limits on U.S. power and policy setbacks reinforce the idea that, while there have been many changes in the international system in recent years, fundamentally it is still based on state sovereignty and pursuit of national interests. 44 Although the United States stands as the only multi-dimensional power and is far ahead of its competitors, it cannot always dictate polices to either target countries or to its allies. In principle, the United States could use its power to bring regime changes and engage in long-term, colonial style occupations that might or might not bring about desired local changes. Such actions, however, would go against new global and American norms against imperialism. Only time will tell if U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq-both interventions driven by security goals but with important human rights implications-will establish a new paradigm. Early evidence from those countries, added to evidence of limits on U.S. commitments to and ongoing problems in Haiti, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia, seems, though, to confirm both American distaste for long-term occupations and nation-building and to show that local realities are the most crucial variable in determining a country's path to stability and democracy.
These limits on U.S. power suggest why U.S. human rights policies are often not successful, but also have affected the chance that efforts are made in the first place. The
American public and many government officials want to see short-term success. If positive change is not guaranteed or occurs slowly, Americans often becomes frustrated or lose interest, and policies are scaled back. Therefore U.S. human rights policy in the future likely will look much as it has in the past with the U.S. pressuring countries from the outside and often failing in its goals.
CONTINUED RESISTANCE TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND ACTIONS
As was discussed earlier, the post-Cold War era has seen the United States take the forward steps of signing some international treaties and supporting international tribunals. Subsequently, though, it has followed its usual pattern of then taking steps backward. When the United States signed several treaties in the late-1980s and early 1990s, two steps were taken to limit the treaties' impact. First, each ratification was accompanied by a series of "reservations,"
"understandings," and "declarations" (RUDs). These sought to clarify U.S. interpretations of particular treaty language and to lay out what actions the United States would or would not take in implementing the treaties. Taken together, the RUDs essentially said the United States would follow the treaties as long as they were consistent with existing U.S. law and would implement the treaties without accepting any obligation to change U.S. law or policy. 45 These positions were in line with long-held beliefs that the U.S. Constitution is the highest law in the land and grants Congress the exclusive power to consider and create all laws. Thus, the validity of treaty guarantees that go beyond constitutional guarantees are questionable and treaties that would require the United States to change laws are problematic.
RUDs are common international practice, but the U.S. RUDs raised the question of whether the United States was actually following the treaties at all. In November 1994, the U.N.
Human Rights Commission adopted a general statement on RUDs with a clear focus on the U.S.
positions. In that statement, the commission expressed "regret" at the U.S. positions and argued that specific U.S. reservations to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were "incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant." 46 Since then, the United States has not ratified any other major human rights treaties. Given the current focus on George W. Bush's unilateralism, it is important to remember that the RUDs and slowdown in treaty signing began before his administration.
The second United States move to limit the impact of the treaties brought back the idea of "Brickerism." Senator John Bricker was a fierce opponent of the United Nations, international legal commitments, and international human rights treaties specifically. In the 18 early-1950s, he led a movement for a constitutional amendment that would have made treaties non-self executing, meaning they would only become valid once Congress passed specific legislation implementing their terms into U.S. law. 47 Bricker's amendment would have asserted a large congressional role in foreign policy-making and served his express purpose: "to bury the so-called Convention on Human Rights so deep that no one holding high public office will ever dare to attempt its resurrection." 48 The movement gained momentum. To assure the measure's close defeat and protect its overall constitutional powers, the Eisenhower administration promised that the United States would not ratify the conventions if Bricker's amendment was defeated. Future administrations moved away from that promise, but for several human rights conventions they returned to Bricker's idea that the treaties should be non-self executing. This requirement places an extra hurdle in the ratification process and provides a way for the United
States to symbolically support human rights by ratification without having to accept any real changes in U.S. policies.
In addition to placing limits on the treaties it has ratified, the United States also has chosen not to join several international treaties that relate more or less directly to human rights.
The United States refused to join the over 100 countries that signed the 1997 Land Mines Treaty after U.S. demands for changes in the treaty were denied. The United States has been slow to accept international efforts to stop the use of child soldiers because of its own efforts to recruit 17 year olds into military service. 49 The United States has signed, but not ratified, the countries argued for an independent court. In the end, the United States accepted a compromise that gave the ICC prosecutor much independence, but allows the Security Council to pass a resolution to suspend an investigation or prosecution for one year. 51 Some U.S. officials still felt the prosecutor was given too much latitude. Also, many argued that United States soldiers and officials were at greater risk of prosecution because of America's greater world role. Clinton officials thus pressed for several ways to limit the chance that Americans would be brought before the court. 52 Most crucial was the principle of complementarity, which means that the ICC cannot proceed with an investigation or prosecution of a crime that is being or has been 20 investigated or prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction, unless the state is unwilling or unable to carry out a fair investigation or trial. 53 Thus, if a U.S. soldier was accused of a crime, the case could go to the ICC only if the U.S. judicial system failed to genuinely investigate the allegation and proceed with a fair trial. Thus, the chance of an American being but put on trial was low, but still present.
Based on these concerns, the United States was one of only seven countries to vote against the Rome Statute. Clinton signed the Statute on December 31, 2000, the last day that countries could become party to the treaty without formal ratification. As he did so, however, he discussed "significant flaws in the treaty," said he would not submit the treaty for ratification. Clinton did raise human rights issues in his campaign against George Bush, but it was clear that he was elected because he remembered the famous slogan "It's the economy, stupid."
Throughout his eight years, Clinton never lost focus on pursuit of a strong economy and embraced the idea that the United States needed access to foreign markets to continue its growth. Conventions would be applied to Taliban captives, although none of them would be granted POW status. 62 Critics suggested that Bush was misapplying definitions in the conventions and that, at a minimum, the administration was required to follow Article 5 of the third Convention that requires a competent tribunal to determine the status of detainees whenever doubt arises as to their status. 63 The administration argued that Article 5 tribunals were not necessary because there was no doubt about the detainees' status. States by the Al Qaeda terrorist network." 64 The Pentagon report was based partly on the Justice memo and went beyond standard military doctrine in laying out acceptable interrogation techniques such as adjusting the temperature to uncomfortable levels, serving cold rations, and reversing sleep cycles from night to day. 65 The White House disavowed the Justice memo and took the unusual step of releasing previously classified documents in an effort to show that Bush never approved torture. However, the overall tough policy on detainees joins the post-9/11 alliances and support for global crackdowns in reinforcing the idea that security interests, like economic interests, still trump human rights concerns and will as long as the United States continues to face security threats. A situation that will continue for the foreseeable future.
CONTINUED WEAKNESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES
Human rights seemed well positioned at the start of the post-Cold War era from the standpoint of bureaucratic and NGO power. The State Department's Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor was now institutionalized. 66 Offices focusing on human rights or the promotion of democracy were being established at the National Security Council, Agency for International Development, the Pentagon and in the economic agencies. Furthermore, particularly during the Clinton administration, key positions were filled with long-time human rights advocates. Given the weakness of governmental actors, human rights policy depends disproportionately on pressure from interest groups and the public. Human rights groups first began to blossom in opposition to President Nixon's policy of realpolitik. They gained momentum during Carter's presidency, and then came to real prominence during the Reagan era when they often sharply disagreed with the administration about particular cases and the overall direction of U.S. policy. In some ways, the Reagan years were difficult, but many human rights leaders agree that the groups ultimately benefited from Reagan's opposition. 69 During that era, human rights debates centered on disputes over the facts of who was a human rights abuser. The groups became increasing professional at gathering and disseminating these facts. Also, during that era, the groups stood out as champions for morality and thus garnered much attention and financial support from those opposed to Reagan's policies. In the post-Cold War era, as the administrations themselves put more focus on human rights, the disputes switched away from facts toward difficult policy choices of how to respond to abuse. Also, the groups were no longer criticizing their ideological enemies, but instead former colleagues who had entered government service. The groups had better access, but that often did not always translate into real policy influence. Additionally, when some government action was taken, the groups were left with a tough decision of whether to celebrate a glass half full, or complain about a glass half 27 empty. Human rights groups also face new challenges because their major strategy of releasing dramatic reports in the hopes of embarrassing countries into better behavior has lost some of its power over time. The first dramatic report might pressure a country, but years of reports lead many rogue states and others to learn to live with the criticism. Meanwhile, the reports suffer domestically from the problem of "compassion fatigue," a sense that a new problem emerges every time an old one gets settled. Human rights groups are now respected parts of the Washington community, but, unless they find new tactics or new problems to focus on, they are unlikely to jumpstart government policies.
Furthermore, human rights issues have not stimulated major grassroots movements, except in unusual cases like South African apartheid. In polls that ask respondents to rate "promoting and defending human rights in other countries" as a policy goal, significantly fewer than half rate it as "very important." 70 Similar results are found for the goal of bringing democracy to other countries. Notably, these polls numbers have been dropping in the post-Cold War era.
One major problem for both governmental and non-governmental human rights advocates is the continued U.S. focus on security and economic interests, which makes their views seem of secondary importance. As noted earlier, these other interests are unlikely to recede any time soon, so advocates will continue to fight an uphill battle. A second problem is that few Americans see human rights abuses abroad as directly affecting their personal interests.
Americans may support principles of morality, but evidence of human rights abuse can often be ignored simply by turning off the television. On the other hand, tax increases to increase foreign aid, embargoes that risk American jobs, or long-term military interventions do directly impact average citizens. Politicians know that they are unlikely to lose an election by disappointing the human rights community, but they could lose one if the side-effects of policies hurt their constituents. Lack of public focus and support for tough reinforces the institutional weakness of governmental and NGO human rights advocates. Thus, while human rights groups are now respected parts of the Washington community and have better access to policy-makers, their 28 policy influence will likely remain low for years to come unless they find new tactics or new problems to focus on.
CONCLUSION
Overall, the post-Cold War period has seen important new U.S. human rights actions both bilaterally and multilaterally. Few observers would dispute that a sharply different policymaking environment exists now to that of thirty, or even a dozen, years ago. Still, major structural constraints remain. U.S. power and ability to force change on others is still limited.
The United States remains wary of international law and multilateral initiatives that can be applied to U.S. domestic policies or constrain foreign actions. Competing national interests, particularly economic growth and antiterrorism, continue to trump human rights concerns.
Domestically, supporters of human rights are still weak actors in the policy-making process. In previous eras, observers often argued a more effective and consistent human rights policy would come if a few variables were altered. The continued existence of key limits in the very different post-Cold War era shows that, in fact, the limits were never short-term, time or issue specific problems, but rather deeper constraints that stem from the realities of global and domestic politics. They did not disappear with the end of the Cold War and they do not vary significantly by administration.
